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A Rawlsian Dual Duty of Assistance
Hugo Omar Seleme
I. Introduction
The publication of John Rawls' The Law of Peoples (henceforth LP) has produced
adverse reactions, even among his philosophical advocates and heirs. Two types
of objections have been frequently made since then. Some have found Rawls' last
book to be incoherent with his former works, while others have simply found it
to be objectionably conservative and insufficiently critical of the injustices in our
real world. They contend that while A Theory of Justice (henceforth TJ) demanded
profound changes in the design of our basic structure, especially to satisfy the
Difference Principle, LP required only minor modifications.'
I think that these criticisms are both related and unfair. A better understanding
of the connection between the domestic and global versions of the theory, leads
to a much more demanding view of the requirements of Rawls' theory of inter-
national justice. I shall try to show this by focusing on the duty of assistance. Once
this duty is articulated with earlier elements of the conception present in TJ, new
requirements come to light which increase the critical potential of Rawls' theory
of global justice.
I owe special thanks to Alyssa Bernstein and Paula Casal for their critical reading of this text and their
important suggestions. I thank the participants of the Pompeu Fabra University political philosophy
seminar for their helpful questions and remarks concerning my argument.
1. Cosmopolitans have developed objections of the two types. In the first group of objections we
find, for example, those indicating that in the international domain, Rawls maintains that the
morally relevant subject is a collective entity-the people-while in previous works, he stated
that the morally relevant subject is the individual. Also included in this group are the critics who
allege that the same arguments that led Rawls to maintain the unjustified nature of the difference
of resources founded on morally irrelevant factors such as race and social class should have led
him to maintain the unjustified nature of the difference of resources between individuals on the
basis of their different political memberships. Pogge points out: "In opposition to cosmopolitan
views, which are based on the interests of all individual human beings worldwide, Rawls claims
that economic inequality in his society of peoples is morally indifferent (p. 120), suggesting that
our concern for the justice of societies fully exhausts our concern for the freedom and well-being
of persons.... (Thomas W. Pogge, "Rawls on International Justice" (2001) 51 Phil. Quarterly
246 at 252).
In the second group of objections we find those who maintain that the Rawlsian conception
does not allow criticism of certain morally incorrect scenarios at an international level. For exam-
ple, Pogge maintains: "Securing merely a fixed minimum, Rawls' Duty of Assistance does not
Protect poor societies against skewed (and deteriorating) international terms of co-operation
exacted from them through the greater (and increasing) bargaining power of the affluent...
Ibid. at 251.
Both types of objection are also found in Charles Beitz, "Rawls's Law of Peoples" (2000) 110
Ethics 669; Allen Buchanan, "Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World"
(2000) 110 Ethics 697; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2002); Fernando R. Tes6n, A Philosophy of International Law (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1998); Kok-Chor Tan, "Liberal Toleration in Rawls's Law of Peoples" (1998) 108 Ethics
276; and Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity and Global Justice (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section II argues that the duty of assistance, like
the duty ofjust savings, is best seen as a specification of the natural duty ofjustice2
Thus understood, the duty of assistance (belatedly added to the Rawlsian conception
ofjustice) fits much better with its earlier parts. Section III addresses three possible
objections to this interpretation of the duty of assistance. Section IV maintains that
interpreting the duty of assistance in this way enables us to appreciate that this duty
involves a demand overlooked by Rawls, viz., the requirement to contribute to the
maintenance of well-ordered institutions abroad. Finally, Section V shows the crit-
ical potential of the duty of assistance once it is interpreted as I propose. To appre-
ciate this potential I will discuss the guides that the duty of assistance prescribes
for dealing with one of the most pressing problems in the international domain:
the foreign debt of developing countries. I maintain that, in fact, Rawls' theory jus-
tifies measures which are as or more progressive than those proposed by his cos-
mopolitan critics. I believe this is important because it shows not only that the same
policies can be derived from very different theories, but that progressive policies
can be derived from very modest and uncontroversial premises
II. The Duty of Assistance as a Specification of the Natural Duty of Justice
Before presenting my case in favour of understanding the duty of assistance as a
specification of the natural duty ofjustice, I should explain the sense in which I
will be using the notion of "specification". It is well-known that one of Rawls' basic
ideas is that the principles used to evaluate basic institutions (both domestic and
international) are not the same as those used to evaluate individual behaviour.
Nevertheless, all the principles, whether they regulate institutions or individual
behaviours, should maintain a coherent relationship. Thus, as Rawls points out,
it would make little sense to adopt the principles ofjustice as fairness for institutions
and the utilitarian principle for individual behaviour; doing so would imply there
is no correspondence between the demands imposed on individuals by an insti-
tutional design and those imposed by moral principles; such an incongruence threat-
ens the stability of a conception of justice.
Congruence can be restored by adopting the natural duty ofjustice as the prin-
ciple guiding individual behaviour in societies regulated by the two domestic prin-
ciples ofjustice. Organizing basic institutions in accordance with these principles,
helping to uphold them, and fulfilling their demands are ways of satisfying the
individual duty of justice. Institutional principles point to the way in which the
institutions should be configured so that the natural duty of justice is satisfied.
2. The first to maintain this interpretation, based on different arguments and extracting different
consequences, was Alyssa Bernstein in her doctoral dissertation. Alyssa Bernstein. Human Rights
Reconceived: A Defense of Rawls' Law of Peoples' (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University, 2000)
[unpublished].
3. As Beitz notes: "... Rawls's strategy is to press social liberalism toward its most progressive
expression and then to ask what more could reasonably be required. If successful, this approach
would disarm cosmopolitan liberalism of its critical thrust by showing that a view with more
conservative premises converges with it at the level of policy" (Beitz, supra note 1 at 678).
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It is in this sense that I claim that institutional principles are a "specification" of
this natural duty.'
I shall now try to show that this relationship of "specification" also exists
between the natural duty ofjustice and the principles that serve to evaluate the for-
eign policy of a liberal people. In particular, I shall argue in favour of considering
the duty of assistance to peoples living under unfavourable conditions to be a "spec-
ification" of the natural duty of justice. In a way, I intend to follow the same path
Rawls follows in TJ with regard to the institutional principle ofjust savings. There,
Rawls establishes which institutional design would enable us to satisfy our natural
duty ofjustice in connection with other generations. Rawls moves from the natural
duty ofjustice toward the institutional principle ofjust savings. Here, I show that
configuring our foreign policy in accordance with the duty of assistance, among
other demands, should be regarded as a way of satisfying our natural duty ofjustice
in connection with individuals belonging to other peoples.
The argument founding my assertion that Rawls understands the duty of assis-
tance as a specification of the natural duty of justice rests on the following two
premises:
(a) Rawls presents the duty of assistance as analogous to the duty ofjust savings.
The most important likeness between them is their aim: creating and preserving
just or decent institutions.
Having reminded us that (i) the aim of the principle ofjust savings is to establish
and preserve just or decent basic institutions, (ii) upon reaching this goal, the savings
rate can drop to zero, and (iii) no great wealth is necessary to establish just or decent
institutions, Rawls explains the analogy between the principle ofjust savings and
the duty of assistance. He writes:
These three features of the savings process discussed in A Theory of Justice bring
out the similarity between the duty of assistance in the Law of Peoples and the duty
of just savings in the domestic case. In each instance, the aim is to realize and preserve
just (or decent) institutions, and not simply to increase, much less to maximize indef-
initely, the average level of wealth, or the wealth of any society or any particular class
in society. In these respects the duty of assistance and the duty ofjust savings express
the same underlying idea.'
Thus, both duties are specifications of an underlying idea.
(b) In TJ, the duty of just savings is expressly presented as a specification of
the natural duty ofjustice among individuals belonging to different generations.
4. Maintaining that institutional principles have a "specification" relationship with the natural duty
ofjustice has no implications for the sequence in which institutional principles and principles
for individuals must be obtained. Thus, by means of the resource of the original position, Rawls
obtains some institutional principles before obtaining principles for individuals, and some after.
Specifically, two institutional principles-the basic equal liberty principle and the difference
principle-are obtained before the natural duty ofjustice, while the institutional principle ofjust
savings is obtained later. Nevertheless, both the former and the later of these institutional principles
satisfy the "specification" relationship with the natural duty of justice, insofar as organizing insti-
tutions according to these principles, contributing to maintaining these institutions so organized,
and complying with institutional requirements are ways of satisfying the natural duty.
5. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) at 107
[emphasis added].
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This duty, as with all natural duty, is characterized as being owed to all individuals,
regardless of whether they have carried out some act or whether they share any
particular institutional organization. Pointing out the idea underlying the just savings
principle, Rawls writes:
The savings principle represents an interpretation, arrived at in the original position,
of the previously accepted natural duty to uphold and to further just institutions. ....1
Premises (a) and (b) suggest a relationship between the duty of assistance and the
duty ofjust savings as well as a relationship between the latter duty and the natural
duty of justice. These relationships justify my understanding of the duty of assis-
tance as a specification of the natural duty ofjustice. If, in Rawls' opinion, the duties
of assistance and just savings express the same underlying idea, and if the idea
underlying the duty of just savings is the natural duty of justice, then the same
should be true for the duty of assistance; its underlying idea must also be the natural
duty of justice, of which the duty of assistance is a specification. The duty of assist-
ing other peoples so that they may establish just or decent political institutions can
be considered a specification of the natural duty of promoting the emergence and
contributing to the maintenance of just institutions. The duty of assistance, as it
is presented in LP, can be regarded as a specification of the natural duty ofjustice,
as it is presented in TJ.
This relationship explains the similarity between the duties of assistance and
just savings. Both aim to create and preserve just or decent institutions because
both are specifications of the natural duty ofjustice. This interpretation of the duty
of assistance suggests that just as the natural duty of justice among individuals
belonging to the same people but to different generations is satisfied where the basic
institutions are organized along the lines of the principle of just savings, so the nat-
ural duty of justice among individuals belonging to different peoples is partially
satisfied by a foreign policy that honors the duty of assistance.
III. Three Possible Objections
The initial attractiveness of the interpretation presented above is that it allows us
to articulate harmonically the duty of assistance within the larger framework of
justice as fairness. The duty of just savings in the domestic case and the duty of
assistance in the international case are thus manifestations of one and the same nat-
ural duty ofjustice. This also explains the analogies Rawls points out between the
duties. In particular, as I have indicated, it allows us to account for one of Rawls'
fundamental conclusions: that the requirements of international distributive justice
are sufficientarian rather than prioritarian requirements.7
However, the proposed interpretation faces three important difficulties. While
the first two problems challenge the consistency of my interpretation of the duty
6. John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1999 (orig.
1971)) at 257.
7. Paula Casal coined the term "sufficientarian."
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of assistance with some Rawlsian positions, the last one jeopardizes one of the
premises of my argument, viz., the analogy between the natural duty ofjustice and
the duty of just savings.8
(i) Natural duties are individual duties
Wilfried Hinsch notes that the duty of assistance cannot be a natural duty-as Rawls
understands this notion-because natural duties are applied directly to human
beings, insofar as they have some natural property in common, whereas the duty
of assistance is applied to collective agents-peoples-which are not classes of
entities sharing natural properties with human beings.'
On my interpretation, the duty of assistance-like the principle ofjust savings
-is a specification of the natural duty ofjustice; it is not, however, in itself a natural
duty. The duty of assistance is an institutional principle used for evaluating the for-
eign policy of a liberal state. Similarly, the principle ofjust savings is a specification
of the natural duty ofjustice, but is in itself an institutional principle. Basic insti-
tutions should satisfy the principle ofjust savings in the same way that the foreign
policy of a liberal people should satisfy the duty of assistance."°
Liberal peoples are bound to organize their foreign policy so that it assists bur-
dened peoples. The subjects of this duty are liberal peoples understood as groups
of politically organized individuals who are united by common bonds of sympathy
and endowed with a certain moral character." The duty requires eminently collective
actions and can only be carried out by peoples as politically organized collective
entities; 2 it requires certain state policies aimed at assisting burdened peoples. 'While
8. One might also object that since all institutional principles, including the difference principle,
are specifications of the natural duty ofjustice, stating that the duty of assistance is a specification
of the natural duty of justice is rather uninteresting. The content of the duties of assistance or
just savings, however, can be determined only on the basis of the natural duty ofjustice. Thus,
the specification relationship is always present, but in a different role.
The way in which Rawls obtains the two domestic institutional principles and the duty ofjust
savings can illustrate the difference. First, institutional principles (the liberty and difference prin-
ciples) are obtained for a society self-contained in space and time. Then, employing these prin-
ciples the content of the natural duty of justice is specified with its two requirements. The
following step (yielding the just savings principle) is to determine which institutional principles
should regulate the basic structure so that citizens are able to satisfy the natural duty ofjustice
in connection with future generations.
The same happens with the duty of assistance. First, we establish the principles of decency
or justice that a self-contained society should satisfy. Then, the content of the natural duty of
justice is specified (in its general version). The following step (yielding the duty of assistance)
is to determine how to interpret the institutional principle of foreign policy that requires assistance
to other peoples so that the individuals within the institutional framework satisfy the natural duty
ofjustice to other peoples. I thank an anonymous referee for a question that prompted this note.
9. Wilfried Hinsch, "Global Distributive Justice" in Thomas Pogge, ed., Global Justice (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2001) at 63.
10. My interpretation departs from Hinsch's suggestion (ibid.) of understanding the duty of assistance
as a natural duty whose subjects are peoples, understood as individual agents.
11. Rawls, supra note 5 at 24-25.
12. Rawls writes: "[I]n developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception ofjustice, we work
out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people ..." (ibid.
at 10).
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this duty cannot be satisfied by the individual actions of any one person, it requires
certain individual behaviors.
The explanation I offer appears to jeopardize the whole undertaking of viewing
the duty of assistance as a specification of the natural duty of justice in that the
former duty refers to peoples and the latter to individuals. If the duties have different
subjects, how can one be the specification of the other? The reason is that in both
cases, the duty demands behaviors on behalf of the individuals; the only difference
is that a people's duty involves actions carried out collectively by politically orga-
nized individuals. Thus, to state that peoples have a duty of assistance does not
commit Rawls to the existence of supra-individual entities. It simply indicates that
collectively organized individuals can carry out actions that are impossible for each
individual to carry out alone. A collective organization broadens the kinds of actions
that individuals can carry out. As long as these actions are not morally neutral, the
duties the individuals are bound to will also impinge upon them.
For illustration, imagine that each of Richard Wagner's disciples secretly
promised him at his deathbed that they will only play his music henceforth. After
ten years as soloists, the disciples form an orchestra. This allows them now to carry
out collective actions, such as interpreting operas. Suppose the director proposes
that the musicians choose the work they will perform from among Tannhdiuser,
Boris Godunov, and Falstaff. Are they obligated to play Tannhiuser? I believe they
are because the orchestra is not a supra-individual entity, but simply a group of
collectively organized individuals. As members of the orchestra, the musicians can
now fulfill their individual promises to Wagner by voting in favor of playing
Tannhduser and by correctly executing their part of the score. The fact that the musi-
cians have been collectively organized has opened a new possibility to fulfill their
previous moral obligation.
Similarly, individuals are bound by the natural duty of justice irrespective of
their institutional relationships3, and therefore regardless of whether they have been
politically organized. However, once they form a society, a new possibility of ful-
filling their natural duty opens up: collective political action. If citizens promote
the adoption of state policies that satisfy the duty of assistance and accept the indi-
vidual costs incurred by their adoption, they will have fulfilled their natural duty
ofjustice." Even though the citizens are subject to the natural duty ofjustice irre-
spective of their institutional relationships, once they are politically organized, the
content of the natural duty becomes what the principle of assistance requires of
13. Rawls attributes this characteristic to all natural duties, including the natural duty ofjustice. He
writes: "... A further feature of natural duties is that they hold between persons irrespective of
their institutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral persons ... " (supra note
6 at 98-99).
14. One might surmise that a natural duty ofjustice requires not only policies, but individual actions
as well. For example, if I promote a foreign aid plan that my co-citizens reject, I have a secondary
duty to aid. However, insofar as for Rawls the primary aim of political justice revolves around
the basic institutional structure, the requirements of justice are mediated by the existence of a
certain institutional organization (ibid. at 6-10). Political justice is therefore a virtue of institutions.
In my view, this is partly why Rawls maintains that peoples are the privileged subjects of the
law of peoples. Individual behaviors that are unmediated by these basic institutions may be
demanded by morality but not by justice.
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them. Only then does the duty of assistance specify the content of the natural duty
of justice.'"
(ii) International dualism and the social nature ofjustice6
Some objectors might allege that my interpretation appears to contradict either"...
the social nature of the virtue ofjustice... .""t or Rawls' dualism regarding domestic
and international justice. Interpreting the duty of assistance as a specification of
the natural duty of justice denies the social nature of justice by implying that it
applies independently of the existence of a basic structure or denies dualism, by
suggesting that there is a global basic structure. If the natural duty ofjustice applies
wherever there is a basic structure and there is a global basic structure, then why
should the institutional principles that are specifications of that natural duty be dif-
ferent in the domestic case and in the international case?
Though initially plausible, this objection fails. First, asserting that the natural
duty ofjustice exists independently of a basic structure is required by the Rawlsian
thesis that it is a natural duty. Such an assertion, however, does not deny the social
nature of justice. Justice is social because wherever there is a basic structure, natural
duties are discharged by reforming that structure according to institutional principles
of justice-if the structure is not just-or obeying it and supporting it if it is just.
Lastly, asserting that the natural duty of justice is specified in the institutional
principles wherever there is a basic structure is compatible with maintaining that
these principles change according to the specific characteristics of this structure
in different contexts.
With the previous specifications in mind, it is now possible to see why my inter-
pretation of the duty of assistance denies neither the social nature of justice nor
dualism. First, Rawls maintains that there is a global basic structure;' 8 therefore,
the specification of the natural duty ofjustice for this context should be institutional
principles like the duty of assistance. Secondly, Rawls maintains that the intema-
tional and the domestic basic structures have different characteristics and that con-
sequently, the institutional principles specifying the natural duty of justice are not
identical. The main difference relates to the morally relevant agents in the two cases.
While at the domestic level, the relevant agents are isolated individuals insofar as
15. The analogy with just savings is useful here. Individuals belonging to different generations satisfy
their natural duty ofjustice by organizing their political institutions according to the just savings
principle. The subjects of the natural duty of justice are individuals. The same is true interna-
tionally: individuals belonging to different peoples satisfy their natural duty ofjustice by orga-
nizing their foreign policy according to, inter alia, the duty of assistance. The just savings principle
can be seen as "... an understanding between generations to carry their fair share of the burden
of realizing and preserving a just society ..." (supra note 6 at 257 [emphasis added]) while the
duty of assistance can be seen as an understanding between peoples to determine the equal share
of effort each should exert to create and maintain other peoples' well-ordered institutions. Rawls
notes that "... persons in different generations have duties and obligations to one another just
as contemporaries do ... " (ibid. at 258). So do individuals belonging to different peoples.
16. I thank an anonymous referee for a question that prompted this section.
17. Rawls, supra note 6 at 110.
18. Rawls, supra note 5 at 61.
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they are interested in promoting their own life plans, at the international level, the
relevant agents are the peoples-i.e., politically organized individuals-whose inter-
ests are determined by a conception of justice. 9 20
(iii) Disanalogy between the duty ofjust savings and the duty of assistance
Finally, one may also object on the grounds that the duty of assistance has no objec-
tive concomitant with TJ's natural duty ofjustice, and thus cannot be its specifi-
cation. Some Rawlsian remarks appear to support this objection. Rawls writes:
"From the standpoint of the theory ofjustice, the most important natural duty is
that to support and to furtherjust institutions... ."2 When formulating the duty of
assistance in LP, in turn, he maintains: "Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples
living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having ajust or decent polit-
ical and social regime."22
The aim of the natural duty of justice is to promote the emergence and main-
tenance ofjust institutions, whereas the aim of the duty of assistance refers to just
or decent institutions. A just institutional framework is not equivalent to a decent
institutional framework for Rawls. 3. While a just society must be organized as a
constitutional democracy, a decent society need not be organized as such. Stressing
this difference, Rawls points out: "I am not saying that a decent hierarchical society
is as reasonable and just as a liberal society. For judged by the principles of a liberal
democratic society, a decent hierarchical society clearly does not treat its members
equally... ."24 The objector reasons that if decency falls short of justice, and the
natural duty of justice refers to justice while the duty of assistance refers to justice
and decency, the duty of assistance cannot be specification of the natural duty of
justice.
My reply is that the difference between the aims of the two duties does not indi-
cate that the duty of assistance is not a specification of the natural duty ofjustice.
On the contrary, the difference can be explained by the fact that TJ seeks appropriate
principles for a democratic, liberal, domestic society. The original position was
configured from the liberal conception of persons as free and equal, and the natural
duty to which the parties would agree is one suited to individuals conceived in this
19. Ibid. at 30-35.
20. Here, I am defending my interpretation from the accusation of inconsistency with either Rawls'
belief in dualism or the social nature of justice. I would need another paper to defend those
Rawlsian beliefs.
21. Rawls, supra note 6 at 293 [emphasis added].
22. Rawls, supra note 5 at 37 [emphasis added].
23. A decent society satisfies the following requirements: (i) it lacks aggressive aims toward other
peoples, and works through peaceful means such as diplomacy and trade; (ii) it orders its legal
system according to a common good idea ofjustice which respects human rights; (iii) its legal
system imposes duties and obligations on individuals within its territory, which it regards as
decent, rational, and responsible; it need not consider its citizens as equal, but as responsible
and cooperative; (iv) officials must sincerely and reasonably believe that the law is guided by
a common good idea ofjustice (Rawls, supra note 5 at 65-67). By contrast, a liberal society is
a constitutional democracy, with apolitical (rather than common good) conception of justice
(Rawls, ibid. at 12, 34, 40).
24. Rawls, supra note 5 at 83.
HeinOnline -- 23 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 170 2010
A Rawlsian Dual Duty of Assistance
way. In other words, the natural duty ofjustice presented in TJ is the natural duty
of those who are part of a liberal society with regard to the manner in which their
domestic institutions should be organized. Hence, it is not surprising that the term
should refer only to justice.
My conjecture is that there is a general natural duty ofjustice whose mandate
is to promote the emergence and contribute to the maintenance of well-ordered insti-
tutions. This formulation is not coextensive with that which is contained in TJ. If
an individual belongs to a liberal people-as TJ assumes-the way to fulfill this
natural duty with regard to domestic institutions is by promoting and sustaining
just- i.e., liberal and democratic-institutions. If, on the other hand, an individual
belongs to a non-liberal people, the way to satisfy this natural duty with regard to
domestic institutions is to promote and to sustain decent institutions.
It is worth noting that this is compatible with sustaining the natural character
of the duty of justice. All human beings have the natural duty of realizing well-
ordered institutions. Belonging to a liberal people does not determine the emergence
of this duty; rather, it determines the particular manner in which it should be ful-
filled. Evidence that Rawls has a wider understanding of the natural duty ofjustice
can be obtained from his comments regarding the duty ofjust savings. The objective
of T's duty ofjust savings is to promote a just institutional framework for the ben-
efit of future generations. The coincidence of objectives between this duty and the
duty of assistance, therefore, should only be partial. However, in LP, Rawls states
that the coincidence of objectives is complete. This can only be so because he has
varied the objective of the just savings duty. The new objective applies to just or
decent institutions. Rawls claims that "savings may stop once just (or decent) basic
institutions have been established."2 This means that if the just savings duty is a
specification of the natural duty ofjustice, and if the former duty's aim is now to
promote the emergence and maintenance of just or decent institutions, the same
should hold for the latter duty.26 The duties of assistance and just savings can thus
be considered specifications of the natural duty ofjustice in his general presentation.
IV. Supporting Well-Orderedness Abroad: A New Requirement Based on
the Duty of Assistance
Having dealt with the above problems, we may now return to my interpretation of
the duty of assistance. This duty is a specification of the general natural duty of
justice, which dictates the manner in which a liberal people's foreign policy should
be organized. If this is so, Rawls' presentation of the requirements contained in
the duty of assistance is incomplete. The duty of assistance, as Rawls presents it,
is not the complete specification of the natural duty ofjustice with regard to indi-
viduals belonging to other peoples. This is because the natural duty ofjustice-in
its general presentation-contains the following two requirements:
25.Ibid. at 107.
26. The difference lies in the fact that TJ's aim is to build appropriate liberal, domestic principles,
and the savings principle aims at liberal justice, rather than mere decency. LP, by contrast, presents
a saving principle for any well-ordered society.
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a) To comply with and to contribute to just or decent institutions where they
exist.
b) To promote the establishment of just or decent institutions where they do
not yet exist.27
If we disregard the requirement to obey just or decent institutions where they
exist, referring only to the domestic institutions whose exigencies we are subject
to, two requirements should remain in relation to foreign just or decent institutions:
a) To contribute to the maintenance of existing just or decent institutions.
b) To assist in the establishment of just or decent institutions where they do
not yet exist.
If the duty of assistance is a specification of the natural duty ofjustice, it should
contain both requirements. Rawls' presentation, however, only contains the latter
requirement. He maintains that this duty only obligates us to assist those peoples
who do not have a just or decent social regime due to unfavorable conditions. What
then is our duty to peoples who have a fairly just or decent regimes? In such cases,
our duty is one of non-intervention.28
On my interpretation of the duty of assistance-unlike other interpretations
attributable to Rawls-the duty applies to both the ideal and the non-ideal theory.
While the duty to assist other peoples to maintain well-ordered institutions belongs
to the ideal theory, the duty to assist societies in unfavorable conditions to achieve
well-orderedness belongs to the non-ideal theory.
Why did Rawls not include the duty of assistance in the ideal theory? The omis-
sion could be due to the following difficulty: any intervention to satisfy the duty
of assistance that belongs to the ideal theory appears to violate self-determination,
which is a key value in the Rawlsian conception of global justice. Maintaining a
foreign policy aimed at preventing a well-ordered, self-governing society from giv-
ing up these attributes would be disrespectful toward its decisions. In other words,
the duty of assisting well-ordered peoples to maintain their institutions would be
contrary to the principle of non-intervention, which is central to the ideal theory.
This objection dissolves, however, when we notice that the same justification
for the principle of non-intervention-valuing self-government-also favors inter-
vention where a people's self-government is at risk. In such a case, not only does
intervention not violate the value of self-government, it is required by it. It would
be inconsistent to defend the principle of non-intervention based on the value of
self-government and then to use this principle to condemn an intervention whose
aim it is to preserve the very value it is grounded on.
Each people has the duty to assist other peoples so that they do not fall below
the critical threshold of self-government necessary "to determine the path of their
own future for themselves." Although each people has the right to make its own
decisions without outside interferences and is held responsible for the results of
its decisions, the right to self-government and the concomitant responsibility is ulti-
mately constrained by sufficiency. Peoples whose policies are going to lead them
27. Both requirements of the natural duty ofjustice in its general version are obtained by extending
TJ's statement of this duty.
28. Rawls, supra note 5 at 37.
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to fall below the critical threshold of self-government should never be abandoned
on the grounds that it is for them to decide their own policies without outside inter-
ferences. Peoples that have fallen below that threshold of self-government or
decency are incapable of functioning as full members of a well-ordered Society
of Peoples, which is the foundation of the duty of assistance that belongs to the
ideal theory. As a full member of a well-ordered Society of Peoples, each people
is required to maintain itself above the critical threshold of self-government and
other peoples have the duty to assist them in doing SO.
29
I therefore believe that Rawls has unduly restricted the duty of assistance. This
duty-as with the natural duty of justice of which it is a specification-contains
the requirement to assist peoples in creating just or decent institutions where they
do not yet exist, and to assist peoples in maintaining those institutions where they
do already exist. If Rawls does not contemplate the latter requirement, his proposal
becomes less coherent.
Finally, as with the just savings duty in the domestic context, the way to satisfy
the duty of assistance-as a specification of the natural duty of justice-varies
according to the type of society that the foreign policy of a liberal people is address-
ing. If it is a non-liberal society, foreign policy must aim at developing or main-
taining decent institutions. If, on the other hand, it is a liberal society, the purpose
of the foreign policy must be justice rather than decency.
V. A Fresh View at Developing Countries' Foreign Debt
My understanding of the duty of assistance has some relevant practical conse-
quences. For illustration, suppose a just or decent people, a full member of the
Society of Peoples, which is able "to determine the path of [its] own future for
[itself], ' 3 is going to make a political decision that will cause the end of its well-
orderedness. Is a liberal people under a duty to prevent that people from taking
such a measure? According to my dual duty of assistance, the answer is yes. Rawls,
however, seems to reject this option because the subjects of this duty are peoples
"... living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent
political and social regime,"3 whereas the people in my example currently has a
just or decent political regime. Rawls thinks that our duty toward this people, which
is about to "commit institutional suicide," is non-intervention.
Suppose now that a well-ordered people is selfishly considering reducing the
savings rate, thereby depriving future generations of a just or decent institutional
framework. How should liberal peoples respond? I believe, pace Rawls, that the
duty of assistance, as a specification of the natural duty of justice, obliges us to
29. See Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" (1999) 109 Ethics 287, for a similar
argument focused on individuals. See Paula Casal, "Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough" (2007)
217 Ethics 296 at 318-323, for a discussion of how the requirement to remain above sufficiency
may provide a way of balancing our respect for the freedom or autonomy of individuals (and
perhaps peoples) and our expression of equal respect and concern for them.
30. Rawls, supra note 5 at 118.
31. Ibid. at 37.
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respond in ways that may vary depending on the case. While sometimes it may suf-
fice to threaten to interrupt diplomatic relations, other times it may be necessary
to offer financial aid to political parties which are struggling to maintain the
required savings rate. A more restricted duty of assistance seems paradoxical: it
provides that we should allow a people to sacrifice their just or decent institutions,
but then requires us to help them regain them. A dual duty of assistance involving
both the creation and the maintenance of well-orderedness seems more feasible
and morally attractive.
Now suppose that the society that is about to sacrifice well-orderedness cannot
do so without the participation of a liberal people. For example, it might want to
borrow such a large sum of capital that future generations, burdened by the repay-
ment of debts and interests, would be incapable of maintaining well-orderedness. 2
Is it plausible to claim that the duty of assistance has no implications in such a case?
That would be the consequence if the duty only required us to help burdened soci-
eties achieve well-orderedness. I believe, on the contrary, that the duty of assistance
should discourage engaging in borrowing practices which, though profitable for
developed countries, may result in the end of their debtors' well-orderedness. The
people from whom the loan is requested must judge what the consequences of its
action will be for the foreign institutions and act accordingly.3
An extension of this example can illustrate not just the costs of rejecting the dual
duty to the overall plausibility of a Rawlsian conception of global justice; it can
also show how endorsing the dual duty is not necessarily more onerous than focus-
ing on the single duty alone. Suppose that, affirming the single duty, each liberal
society imprudently lends large sums of capital to decent societies, which are in
the process of becoming just. Now, those decent societies have become burdened
and not only have they lost all hope of becoming just-their well-orderedness has
crumbled with serious spill-over effects on neighboring societies. Eventually, entire
areas of the globe, which could have progressed to justice, will find themselves
struggling with financial chaos, corruption, and instability. Having created a rod
for their own backs, liberal societies now have a very onerous single duty of assis-
tance not only to those societies to which they offered the initial loan, but also to
those which have become burdened by the spill-over effects of the end of well-
orderedness in the area. Given the importance that Rawls awards to domestic justice,
32. Rawls disregards the possibility of current generations not merely failing to save, but appropriating
the savings of future generations. Since the just savings principle ensures that each generation
receives the economic benefits it deserves from its predecessor and does its part in benefiting
its successors, Rawls wrongly assumes "[iut is a natural fact that generations are spread out in
time and actual economic benefits flow only in one direction..." (Rawls, supra note 6 at 254).
When a generation takes out a loan which will burden future generations, it has not only failed
to fulfill its obligation of benefiting them, but has actually profited at their expense. Economic
benefits can flow in either direction and the principle of just savings should contemplate this
possibility.
33. The fact that on certain occasions such judgments should be made in conditions of extreme uncer-
tainty does not dismiss the obligation of formulating them. The error caused by uncertainty may
be an excuse to avoid moral reproach for the duty neglected, but it does not eliminate the trans-
gression. I do not think that this excuse is available to the creditor countries of the Latin American
public debt. As evidenced by the data referring to the Argentine case, the loans were granted
with total disregard for the effects they would produce on the domestic institutions.
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stability, and well-ordered national and international cooperation, it seems odd to
insist on an interpretation of the duty of assistance that permits international prac-
tices which may lead to the destruction of all these values on a massive scale.34
This single duty of assistance also has problematic consequences when assessing
the duties of a liberal people toward a well-ordered people to whom it has already
granted a loan. If the people requesting the loan is well-ordered, the only duty
applied to the situation is "... to observe treaties and undertakings."35 The debtor
has the duty to repay and the creditor has the right to collect, regardless of whether
this jeopardizes the debtor society's well-orderedness. Under the dual duty of assis-
tance, by contrast, liberal creditors must contribute to the maintenance of well-
orderedness abroad. Thus, they may collect the stipulated interests unless doing
so will predictably result in the spillage of the end of well-orderedness, instability,
and death abroad.
The dual duty also has consequences for societies burdened by debts incurred
by outlaw regimes to prolong the duration of illegitimate governments which con-
dition the policies of subsequent democratic regimes. For example, the peoples that
gave financial assistance to the dictatorial regimes that devastated Latin America
during the seventies doubly violated the dual duty of assistance. First, they failed
to assist in the emergence of just or decent institutions, which could have been
accomplished by financially isolating these regimes. Secondly, when despite the
financial assistance given to their illegitimate rules, these countries managed to
set up working democracies, their task was hindered by the lenders' insistence on
interests on debts incurred by the illegitimate rulers. Such insistence restricted their
possibilities for action and jeopardized their very continuity.
My native Argentina is a paradigmatic example of this double violation. During
the last military dictatorship-from 1976 to 1983-Argentina's foreign debt grew
by more than 300%.36 Those who granted loans violated the duty of assisting the
34. I owe this paragraph to Paula Casal.
35. Rawls, supra note 5 at 37.
36. In 1975, the private sector's debt was $4.941 million while the public sector's debt was approx-
imately $9.144 million. By the end of the military dictatorship in 1983, private debt had reached
$13.526 million and public debt had reached $31.561 million (Alfredo Calagno & Eric Calagno,
La Deuda Externa Explicada a Todos (los que deben pagarla) (Buenos Aires: Catlogos, 1999)).
This capital largely surfaced in personal accounts abroad (Mario Rapoport, Historia Econdmica,
Politicay Social de la Argentina (1880-2000) 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires: Macchi, 2003) at 825).
The fund's other destination involved paying the profits of the financial speculation which took
advantage of the differential between domestic and foreign interest rates. Lastly, part of the debt
was used to buy arms. The main arms exporter was the Federal Republic of Germany (Rapoport,
this note at 808). Virtually all Latin American countries have been affected by massive foreign
debts. Between 1970 and 1980 the region's global debt rose from $20.9 million to $243 million,
an increase of 1.162%. What makes the Argentinean case paradigmatic, however, is the des-
tination of the funds. Debt was contracted by an illegitimate government to finance an economic
plan that destroyed its productive apparatus. The policies financed with foreign debt had a deep
impact on the population. During 1976 alone-the year of the coup-real wages dropped by
37%, to the 1945 level. The participation of wages in the national income dropped from 45%
in 1974 to 27% in 1983 (Alfredo Lattes, "Auge y Declinaci6n de las Migraciones en Buenos
Aires" in Jorge Raul Jorrat & Ruth Suti, comp., Despuis de Germani. Exploraciones sobre la
Estructura Social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Paid6s, 1992) at 186-96). Another pernicious
effect was the income concentration. Urban Gini coefficients increased from 0.366 in 1975 to
0.4 10 in 1980 (Rapoport, this note at 834). The magnitude of the change in the Argentinean
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birth of Argentinean well-orderedness. Additionally, after the assumption of a demo-
cratic government in 1983, they violated the duty of contributing to the maintenance
of Argentinean well-orderedness. Collecting the initial capital and the interests was
one of the main factors that conditioned the legitimate government's field of action,
and ultimately contributed to its premature demise."
I hope this reflection has shown the convergence between Rawls' advocates and
his critics at the level of policy-particularly with respect to policies guaranteeing
thepreservation rather than the creation of well-orderedness abroad-such as those
proposed by Thomas Pogge. I think, like Pogge, that it is important (i) to deter ille-
gitimate regimes from taking out loans in the name of the people on whom they
have imposed their government, (ii) to disincentivise coups in this and other man-
ners and (iii) to make it more difficult for democratic, liberal governments to justify
granting financial aid to illegitimate regimes before their own people. Pogge pro-
poses a constitutional amendment which states "that debts incurred by future uncon-
stitutional governments-by rulers who acquire or exercise power in violation of
our democratic constitution-must not be serviced at public expense... -"I Such
preventive measures find full justification in the dual duty. The single duty, by con-
trast, cannot justify policies like those proposed by Pogge because its aim is only
to create well-ordered institutions where they do not exist-not to help maintain
them, for example, by preventing coup d'6tats-where they do exist.
basic structure can be appreciated by considering that in 1950, the participation of wages in
the national income was 60.9%, while only five years earlier, in 1945, it was 46.7%. (SAE,
Secretaria de Asuntos Econ6micos, Producto e Ingreso de la Reptiblica Argentina en el Periodo
1935-1954 (Buenos Aires: SAE, 1955)).
37. In 1983, the recently elected democratic government faced a foreign debt of 70% of the GDP,
with no international reserves. Although the reserves available had amounted to $1.5 million,
a few days before handing over power, the military government drained the reserves by paying
weapons that had been used in the Malvinas conflict (Salvador Treber, Salvador, La economia
argentina actual: 1970-1987. (Buenos Aires: Macchi, 1987)). When democracy returned, the
country owed $20 million and had to postpone payments. It tried to re-negotiate so that payments
would not exceed 15% of exports, thus avoiding the need to accept the depressive requirements
of an IMF Stand-by loan. At a London G7 meeting, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia
expressed the need to revise the debt, given its illegitimate origins. The response was devastating:
a bilateral "solution" included severe austerity measures for the indebted. Argentina promoted
the "Cartagena's Consensus" by bringing together eleven nations representing 93% of the Latin
debt and establishing the principle of co-responsibility of the creditor countries in debt accrual,
which Western pressure rendered wet paper (Roberto Russell, "Democracia y Politica Exterior"
in Rubin M. Perina, Roberto Russell, eds, Argentina en el Mundo. 1973-1987. Colecci6n de
Estudios Internacionales (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1988)).
So the Argentinean government ultimately signed an IMF stand-by loan to pay back its foreign
debt. Consequently, the country faced the following difficulties: i) worse terms of exchange
reduced the income of foreign currency, mainly due to subsidies for agricultural products and
closing markets in central countries; ii) state accounts were hard to balance because of the debt's
high interests; iii) public spending and salaries were drastically cut, which generated a recession;
iv) the need to purchase foreign currency to pay interest on the debt generated inflation; and v)
the foreign currency generated by the trade surplus was insufficient; therefore, it was necessary
to increase the debt to make good on interest payments. The debt burden chiefly contributed to
hyperinflation, causing the fall Alfonsin's government in 1989. Again, the impact on the basic
structure was devastating. In 1989-after the debt generated austerity, recession, and hyperin-
flation-the participation of wage earners in the national income was barely 20% (Rapoport,
supra note 36 at 926).
38. Pogge, supra note 1 at 153-54.
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The dual duty, moreover, forbids lending not only to illegitimate governments,
as Pogge recommends, but also to legitimate governments when doing so will end
well-orderedness because of its effects on just savings. My interpretation of the
duty of assistance both supports and extends beyond the policies proposed by
Rawls' cosmopolitan critics. While Pogge only condemns loans to illegitimate gov-
ernments39, the dual duty of assistance also forbids lending to legitimate govern-
ments where the burden that external debt imposes on the savings rate threatens
well-orderedness abroad. Those who jeopardize well-orderedness abroad are co-
responsible for the end of well-orderedness and must therefore contribute financially
to its restoration.
Based on this evidence, some might conclude that the dual duty of assistance
cannot be Rawls' idea, and will find conflict in extending the Rawlsian conception
of international justice in morally attractive directions-unexplored by Rawls him-
self-and reconstructing the Rawlsian conception ofjustice as a coherent whole.
I disagree. Rawls himself failed to realize the potential of his own conception of
international justice, which is why LP subscribes to presumptions whose conse-
quences should have led him to the interpretation defended here. Thus, when refer-
ring to the likeness between the just savings duty and the duty of assistance, he
says, "in each instance, the aim is to realize and preserve just (or decent) institu-
tions... ."' Given such an aim, the duty of assistance should be relevant not only
to the creation but to the maintenance of well-orderedness abroad. The dual duty
of assistance is thus more consistent with Rawlsian presumptions than the single
duty presented by Rawls himself.
VI. Conclusion
My interpretation of the duty of assistance as a specification of the natural duty
of justice has several virtues:
a) It enables us to appreciate how this duty fits into the complex structure of
justice as fairness. Specifically, it shows that one of the most important principles
of the conception of international justice presented in LP coheres with a principle
that was already present in TJ, and undermines the criticism that Rawls' domestic
and international conceptions are at odd with each other.
b) It extends the requirements of the duty of assistance in directions unexplored
by Rawls himself. Specifically, it enables us to appreciate that the duty of assistance
contains two requirements: helping peoples to create well-ordered institutions where
such institutions do not yet exist and helping peoples to maintain them where they
do already exist.
c) The farsighted dual duty of assistance is a useful guide with which to broach
the current problem of developing countries' foreign debt; it introduces objective,
non-arbitrary criteria for determining the legitimacy of collecting debts that are
39. Given the effects of such a loan's impact on future generations, I believe Pogge would agree with
the implications of the dual duty of assistance.
40. Rawls, supra note 5 at 107 [emphasis added].
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owed by decent, even democratic and liberal peoples. The duty focuses on the sav-
ings rate that the debt imposes on future generations-an objective criterion-
rather than on the legitimacy of those who contracted it-arguably a subjective
criterion.
The dual duty is thus far from conservative. It supports preventive policies such
as those proposed by Pogge, condemns granting loans to illegitimate governments,
and refrains from collecting loans granted to legitimate governments that will jeop-
ardize well-orderedness abroad.
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